
Winning isn’t everything; it’s the only thing. — Football Coach Henry Russell Sanders
How many times have we heard an NFL football crowd chant, “Go for it! Go for it!” only to watch the coach kick the ball on 4th down?
Aren’t National Football League coaches bold, aggressive, fearless decision-makers? Well, not according to a CAL-Berkeley study authored by David Romer. The study, Do Firms Maximize? Evidence from Professional Football, looked at play-by-play decisions on 4th down in the first quarters of 732 NFL games in the 1998, 1999 and 2000 seasons. Cutting to the chase, the researchers found that most NFL coaches made comparatively poor 4th down decisions, avoiding perceived risks in a statistically significant way, and that these decisions consistently lowered their chances of winning.
Overall, of the 1068 fourth downs where the data indicated the teams should ‘go for it’ (run or pass rather than kick), the teams kicked the ball 959 times. The coaches chose a play that was statistically advantageous to winning less than 10% of the time.
With all the high-paid staff and resources in the NFL…
- Why did almost all coaches make the same statistically wrong, and so-easy-to-prove (for mathematicians at least) decisions over and over?
- Would any other competitive industry overlook such a simple and important tool for success?
- What is it in the football industry that discourages innovative problem solving, and makes a flawed process an industry standard?
One particular situation that was studied was 4th downs on the 2-yard line of the opponent. This single play…trying for a touchdown rather than a field goal, would increase the team’s chances of winning by 3 percent…not an insignificant percentage for a football team, or a business. But in all 9 actual game time decisions on 4th and goal at the two yard line the coaches chose to kick a field goal.
Why? The study lays out some possible answers and points to business lessons worth learning.
Lesson 1) Build a Staff with Diverse Talents and Perspectives
How many mathematicians are on an NFL staff? The CAL study indicates the failure of NFL coaches to make the optimum decision often lay not in their bad decision making, but on their lack of adequate information. While their ability to process information on weather, turf, momentum, injuries, conditioning, and other tactical information is immense — number crunching and statistical analysis may not be their strong suit.
To a large extent, NFL teams are very open to new competitive advantages such as hiring nutritionists, sports psychologists, weight trainers, soccer kicking coaches, motivational speakers…why not statistical experts?
Lesson 2) Be Willing To Question The Established Way Of Thinking
The CAL study does not suggest that NFL coaches are consciously trying to undermine their chances of winning. But by neglecting the true statistical implications of 4th down options, they are making those choices in an ‘imperfect’ decision-making world. They choose to rely more on intuition and experience and industry accepted standards.
Lesson 3) Encourage Risk Taking & Forgive Failures
Who will take a calculated risk if failure means being demoted, ridiculed, or fired?
In the early days of computers, it was often said that Purchasing Managers would, with little contemplation, buy IBM computers for the sole reason they knew they had covered their tails in the event of future computer malfunctions. “I bought the best (followed the crowd)…you can’t blame me for that.”
The CAL study indicates NFL coaches are often doing the same…kicking…because that’s the prudent thing to do in the eyes of the majority…perhaps even when they might personally believe that ‘going for it’ is the smart thing to do.
I suspect many of the greatest innovators in the NFL have been coaches who had the full confidence of their owners. Coach Tom Landry (Dallas Cowboys) recruiting Gold Medal Sprinter Bob Hayes as a wide receiver is a standout example of a successful innovation by a coach who could afford to risk failure.
Lesson 4) Commit 100% to your Common Goal
The CAL study indicates that secondary goals and agendas bring conflicting priorities into decision making, and thus can lead coaches to choose actions they know are not in the best interests of winning.
Secondary considerations include natural risk aversion, failure to consult with others in the decision making process, fear of (media, fan, owner, player) criticism, fear of losing a job, or fear of being demoted.
But if leaders are wholeheartedly committed to winning, then certain decisions are mandated…even if they aren’t popular, or are in conflict with secondary goals. And those statistically mandated decisions were consistently made incorrectly in the CAL study.
I have to conclude that, if one of the most competitive and innovative industries in the U.S. economy (pro football) has institutionalized a ‘flawed’ method of decision making, surely there must be countless other established industries that could benefit from re-evaluating the make-up of their organizations and their internal decision making processes.
- Does your business access year-on-year data to build a model based on actual outcomes?
- Can you identify secondary goals and agendas that undermine performance in your business?
- Are we even asking the right questions? Are there overarching considerations that would call your business to the standard set by sportswriter Grantland Rice:
For when the One Great Scorer comes
To write against your name,
He marks - not that you won or lost -
But how you played the Game.







Comment: (One)
It’s interesting that last night, Denver Broncos coach, Mike Shanahan, down by one point with time running out against the San Diego Chargers, decided to go for a two point conversion on the point after and a win, rather than a one point conversion and a tie leading to overtime.
The announcers were second guessing that decision. The crowd was pumped up by the gamble.
Denver converted on a pass to their rookie receiver and won the game.
To win in that manner probably also lifted the confidence of the relatively young lineup of the Broncos.